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INFO SECDEF WASHDC
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SECDEF FOR ADS:ISA/DSAA, CINCEUR FOR ECJ4/7-SA

DEPT PASS ACDA & AID

E.O. 11652: GDS
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SUBJECT: INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
REF: STATE 167901, 010215Z JUL78 (C)

1. A SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRIA (GOA) IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH, AND SUPPORTIVE OF, MAJOR U.S. INTERESTS IN AUSTRIA. THESE INTERESTS ARE LARGELY A FUNCTION OF AUSTRIA'S POLICY OF NEUTRALITY AND STRATEGIC LOCATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WERE SET FORTH IN EMBASSY VIENNA'S MOST RECENT ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT (77 VIENNA 2401). A PRO-WESTERN, MILITARILY NEUTRAL AUSTRIA COMPLICATES WARSAW PACT PLANNING AND REDUCES THE OVERLAND MILITARY AND POLITICAL THREAT TO ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA. CONVERSELY, ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO OVERRUN OR SUBVERT AUSTRIA WOULD UPSET THE POLITICAL-MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE. THEREFORE, THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVE IS TO ASSIST AND ENCOURAGE AUSTRIA IN MODERNIZING
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ITS ARMED FORCES, ENABLING IT MORE EFFECTIVELY TO DETER INTRUSION OF HOSTILE FORCES INTO AUSTRIAN TERRITORY.

2. AUSTRIA PERCEIVES INTERNAL THREATS AS MINIMAL; THE ONLY FORESEEABLE ONE WOULD BE ENGENDERED BY THE SLOVENE MINORITY IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES. INTERNAL SUBVERSION WOULD MOST LIKELY COME VIA INFILTRATION OF GUERRILLA FORCES INTO THOSE

AREAS, FORCES WHICH MIGHT BE SUPPORTED BY LOCAL MINORITY DISSIDENTS. THE AUSTRIANS PROBABLY LOOK UPON THE THREE EASTERNMOST ROUTES FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA (VIA ZNOJMO, POHORELICE, AND BRATISLAVA) AS THE MOST LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH FOR WARSAW PACT PENETRATION FORCES. THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THESE FORCES WOULD BE TO NEUTRALIZE AUSTRIA AND GAIN ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY VIA THE DANUBE VALLEY TO LINK UP WITH ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH CZECH ARMIES ATTACKING IN A SOUTHWESTWARDLY DIRECTION THROUGH THE FUERTH GAP. IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK BY WARSAW PACT FORCES, AUSTRIAN STRATEGIC PLANNING CURRENTLY CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL TO A REDOUBT AREA IN THE CENTRAL ALPINE REGION. PRECEDING THE WITHDRAWAL, DELAYING ACTION WOULD BE CONDUCTED TO AFFORD THE COUNTRY A BRIEF PERIOD FOR MOBILIZATION OF TERRITORIAL RESERVE FORCES. AUSTRIAN FORCES, REGULAR AND NEWLY MOBILIZED, WOULD THEN HOPE TO PUT UP A PROLONGED RESISTANCE IN THE ALPINE FORTRESS IN THE CENTRAL AND WESTERN PARTS OF AUSTRIA. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS CURRENTLY IMPLEMENTING A REORGANIZATION OF RESERVE FORCES SO THAT UNITS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED ALONG THE TERRITORIAL "HOME GUARD" CONCEPT USED IN SWITZERLAND AND THE U.S. NATIONAL GUARD. THE AUSTRIAN PLANNING STAFF PROBABLY WOULD CONCEDE THAT DETERRENCE OF AN INVADING FORCE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, IN THE FLATLAND AREAS OF EASTERN AND NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES. SINCE THE MAIN WARSAW PACT OBJECTIVE/GOAL WOULD PROBABLY BE, IN THE

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INITIAL STAGES OF AN ATTACK, TO USE AUSTRIAN TERRITORY PRIMARILY AS AN AVENUE FOR THE PASSAGE OF FORCES RATHER THAN A TACTICAL BASE FOR OPERATIONS, WARSAW PACT PLANNERS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE CONCERNED WITH A TAKEOVER OF ALL OF AUSTRIA'S TERRITORY IN THE EARLY PHASES OF THE CONFLICT.

3. THIS MISSION BASICALLY CONCURS WITH THE GOA'S PERCEPTION OF THREAT. WE DO NOT FEEL THAT ANY THREAT EXISTS FROM FORCES OUTSIDE OF THE WARSAW PACT (SPECIFICALLY YUGOSLAVIA) UNLESS REGIONAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES CHANGE RADICALLY. THE DANUBE VALLEY PRESENTS WARSAW PACT FORCES WITH A GEOGRAPHICALLY PASSABLE ROUTE FOR INTRUSION INTO THE SOUTHERN REGIONS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. THIS ROUTE IS ONE WHICH AUSTRIAN FORCES CANNOT CONTROL, NOR COULD THEY REALISTICALLY DELAY THE PASSAGE OF INVADING FORCES THROUGH IT.

4. AUSTRIAN MILITARY PLANNERS' BELIEFS IN THE TYPE OF FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIRED TO ADEQUATELY DEFEND AUSTRIAN TERRITORY IS TEMPERED BY THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF THE RULING SOCIALIST PARTY WHICH IS SKEPTICAL AND DISTRUSTFUL OF THE MILITARY IN GENERAL. A LARGE AND WELL-EQUIPPED

REGULAR ARMY IS THEREFORE POLITICALLY NOT FEASIBLE. TO OVER-
COME THIS, THE AUSTRIAN MILITARY IS IMPLEMENTING A PROGRAM
WHEREBY MORE RESPONSIBILITY IS DELEGATED TO THE TERRITORIAL
(RESERVE) COMMANDS. THE CURRENT REGULAR FORCES ARE UTI-
LIZED AS CADRE TO TRAIN RESERVE FORCES. THE MAJORITY OF
REGULAR FORCES ARE CONCENTRATED IN COMMAND AND STAFF

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POSITIONS, WITH A SMALL "READY FORCE" COMPOSED OF ARMOR
AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY UNITS. IN THE EVENT OF OPEN CON-
FLICT, THE "READY FORCE" WOULD BE THE MAIN ELEMENT TO
WITHDRAW TO THE ALPINE FORTRESS AREA TO OVERSEE THE GENERAL
DEFENSIVE ACTIONS OF THE TERRITORIAL FORCES.

5. THE CURRENT AUSTRIAN MILITARY IS COMPLETELY INADEQUATE
TO STOP AN ADVANCE OF WARSAW PACT FORCES THROUGH AUSTRIAN
TERRITORY. AUSTRIAN AIR DEFENSE IS TOTALLY INADEQUATE TO
DETER SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT FROM OVERFLYING OR ATTACKING
AUSTRIAN TERRITORY AND WILL REMAIN SO AS LONG AS AUSTRIA
IS PROHIBITED FROM POSSESSING ANY SELF-PROPELLED OR GUIDED
MISSILES AND THEIR DISCHARGE OR CONTROL SYSTEMS, PROHIBI-
TIONS INCLUDED IN ARTICLE 13 OF THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY
OF 1955. IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK, MOBILIZATION OF
AUSTRIAN RESERVE FORCES COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED IN TIME
TO EFFECTIVELY DETER INVADING FORCES. AUSTRIAN AIRCRAFT

ARE OBSOLETE AND INCAPABLE OF TAKING ACTION AGAINST WARSAW
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PACT AIRCRAFT.

6. AUSTRIAN DEFENSE SPENDING TYPICALLY ACCOUNTS FOR SLIGHTLY OVER 1 PERCENT OF GNP. IN FY 1978 (USFY BASIS) TOTAL GNP AMOUNTED TO \$52.8 BILLION OF WHICH \$742 MILLION (1.4 PERCENT) WENT TO THE DEFENSE EFFORT. LONG-TERM AVERAGE GNP GROWTH IS ESTIMATED AT 3.5 PERCENT ANNUALLY IN REAL TERMS (7.5 PERCENT NOMINAL). NO SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE SHARE OF GNP ALLOCATED FOR DEFENSE SPENDING IS ANTICIPATED IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS. FURTHER DETAILS AND ASSUMPTIONS MAY BE FOUND IN TABLE D-2, FY 80-84 MSAP. MILITARY IMPORTS HAVE RECENTLY ACCOUNTED FOR LESS THAN 1 PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS. WHILE AUSTRIA CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE SERIOUS FOREIGN EXCHANGE OR DEBT SERVICE PROBLEMS, DEBT SERVICE HAS BEEN RISING AS AN ELEMENT IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET (11.6 PERCENT OF 1978 FEDERAL BUDGET IS ALLOCATED FOR DEBT SERVICING).

7. REFER TO TABLE D-1, FY 80-84 MSAP.

8. DEFENSE ARTICLES:

A. FIGHTER AIRCRAFT: AUSTRIA CURRENTLY POSSESSES THE SAAB 105. THESE AIRCRAFT ARE OBSOLETE AND AUSTRIA IS SEEKING TO REPLACE THEM; THE SWEDISH VIGGIN AND THE U.S. F-5E ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION. AS WE PERCEIVE CURRENT GOA THINKING ON THIS MATTER, THE GOA IS CONSIDERING THE VIGGIN AS A FIGHTER/BOMBER AND THE F-5E AS A RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.

B. HELICOPTERS: AUSTRIA CURRENTLY HAS 12 OH-58B ARMED HELICOPTERS. THE REMAINING HELICOPTERS CONSIST OF TWO CH-53, 24 AB-204B AND 24 FRENCH ALLOUET, ALL UNARMED AND
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USED FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND TROOP TRANSPORT. GOA IS CONSIDERING THE PURCHASE OF 24 AB-212 HELICOPTERS, WHICH ARE ALSO UNARMED. TO ENHANCE THE GOA'S RECONNAISSANCE AND DEFENSE POSITION, WE RECOMMEND THE PURCHASE OF AN ADDITIONAL 24 UH-1N OR UTTAS HELICOPTERS, WHICH WOULD BE ARMED AND CAPABLE OF TRANSPORTING TROOPS AS WELL AS ENGAGING IN DEFENSIVE ACTIONS.

C. TANKS: AUSTRIA HAS ASKED THE USG FOR A LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (LOA) FOR THE PURCHASE OF 50 M60 TANKS TO REPLACE AGING AND OBSOLETE M-47 TANKS IN ITS INVENTORY. THIS WOULD EQUIP A THIRD ARMOR BATTALION WITH THE LATEST VERSION OF MEDIUM TANKS, RELEASING THE M-47 TANKS FOR UTILIZATION BY RESERVE FORCES. THESE TANKS WOULD BE USED FOR DEFENSE, TO PREVENT INCURSION OF HOSTILE FORCES INTO AND THROUGH AUSTRIAN NATIONAL TERRITORY. IN ADDITION, GOA HAS ASKED FOR A TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE TO CONVERT THE 120 M60 TANKS ON HAND TO THE IMPROVED M60A1-RISE MODEL AND AN ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE TO CONVERT ALL TANKS TO THE M60A3 MODEL. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT GOA OFFICIALS ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING PRODUCTION OF THEIR OWN MEDIUM TANK, THE FIRST FINISHED PRODUCT TO BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE 1980'S.

D. OTHER ITEMS: AUSTRIA IS CURRENTLY INCLUDED IN THE COOPERATIVE LOGISTICS SUPPLY-SUPPORT ARRANGEMENT WITH THE U.S. ARMY, WHEREBY IT PURCHASES SPARE PARTS AND REPLACEMENT ITEMS FOR EQUIPMENT IN ITS INVENTORY. GOA IS ALSO INVOLVED IN SEVERAL BLANKET OPEN-END SALES CASES WITH THE U.S. AIR FORCE. GOA PURCHASES AMMUNITION FROM THE USG FOR USE IN TRAINING AND IN STOCKAGE OF ITS STRATEGIC DEFENSE DEPOTS. ALL ITEMS ARE USED FOR DEFENSE.

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9. IN RECENT YEARS AUSTRIA HAS EXPERIENCED A RAPIDLY GROW-
ING AND SIZEABLE TRADE DEFICIT. STRONG EFFORTS TO REDUCE
THIS HAVE SHOWN POSITIVE RESULTS DURING THE INITIAL MONTHS
OF 1978, BUT IT IS TOO EARLY TO KNOW WHETHER OR NOT IM-
PROVEMENT WILL CONTINUE, AT LEAST AT RECENT RATES.
ADDITIONAL CASH PURCHASES OF U.S. ARTICLES AND SERVICES
WILL, PRESUMABLY, RUN COUNTER TO EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE
DEFICIT BUT FOR THE TANK PROGRAM, AT LEAST, THE GOA
APPEARS TO HAVE MADE THE NECESSARY BUDGET ALLOCATION FOR
PAYMENT. (MOREOVER, THIS PURCHASE COULD CONCEIVABLY
REPLACE OTHER IMPORTED ITEMS AND HAVE A NEUTRAL B/P
EFFECT.) IN ANY CASE, SINCE THE RELATIVELY SMALL SHARE OF
GNP DEVOTED TO DEFENSE SPENDING IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN
FAIRLY CONSTANT, ACQUISITION OF PROJECTED ITEMS WILL NOT
HAVE A DISRUPTIVE EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY. BECAUSE SOME OF
THE PROJECTED ACQUISITIONS WILL PROVIDE JOBS FOR AUSTRIAN
WORKERS, AND FULL EMPLOYMENT IS THE GOA'S TOP PRIORITY,
THE GOA WILL HAVE AN EXCELLENT ARGUMENT FOR THE ACQUISI-
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TIONS. IF THE GOA IS TO MOVE BEYOND THE TANK PROGRAM TO
ACQUISITION OF F-5E AIRCRAFT, FMS FINANCING MAY WELL BE
REQUIRED. IN FACT, IT PROBABLY WOULD BE THE DECISIVE
FACTOR FOR AIRCRAFT ACQUISITIONS FOR WHICH THE AUSTRIANS
HAVE BEEN SEEKING OFFSET ARRANGEMENTS.

10. THE SALE OF ALL THE ITEMS ABOVE WOULD BE IN ACCORD
WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ARMS TRANSFER POLICY IN THAT ALL
WOULD BE USED TO IMPROVE AUSTRIA'S OWN DEFENSE CAPABILI-
TIES. NONE OF THE SALES WOULD INTRODUCE SIGNIFICANT NEW
CAPABILITIES INTO THE REGION.

11. AUSTRIA HAS AN EXEMPLARY RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
WHICH HAS NOT CHANGED SINCE THE MOST RECENT, REQUIRED
REPORT SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO
AUSTRIA, WHICH MAINTAINS ONLY A DEFENSIVE MILITARY CAPA-
BILITY, WILL ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF AUSTRIA TO MAINTAIN
ITS EXEMPLARY HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD SINCE THE ONLY CONCEIV-
ABLE THREAT TO AUSTRIA'S TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL
INTEGRITY COMES FROM CONTIGUOUS TOTALITARIAN COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES. THE ONLY PRESENT AND CONCEIVABLE FUTURE EM-
PLOYMENT OF AUSTRIAN MILITARY FORCES OUTSIDE AUSTRIA IS
IN THE SERVICE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES OF
THE UNITED NATIONS. INsofar AS U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERA-
TIONS SERVE THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSISTING
AUSTRIA TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY OF ITS MILI-
TARY FORCES MAY SERVE TO ENHANCE HUMAN RIGHTS ELSEWHERE.

12. AUSTRIA TO OUR KNOWLEDGE RECEIVES NO ECONOMIC ASSIS-
TANCE FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE. HOWEVER, AUSTRIA DOES HAVE

TECHNICAL AND INFORMATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH SWEDEN
AND SWITZERLAND. AUSTRIA SELLS LIGHTLY-ARMED ARMORED
PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES TO SWITZERLAND
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AND TUNISIA.

13. LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE:

A. LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL) - AUSTRIA CURRENTLY RECEIVES
NEITHER MAP ASSISTANCE NOR FMS FINANCING. AUSTRIA DOES
RECEIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCA-
TION AND TRAINING (IMET) PROGRAM, CURRENTLY PROJECTED AT
\$60,000 PER YEAR. THE MINIMUM LEVEL FOR SUCH TRAINING
WOULD BE \$20,000 ANNUALLY TO AFFORD ONE HIGH-RANKING
OFFICER THE OPPORTUNITY TO ATTEND EITHER THE ARMY COMMAND
AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, THE AIR COMMAND AND STAFF
COLLEGE, OR ONE OF THE SERVICES' SENIOR COLLEGES.

B. LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) - WE RECOMMEND NO
ASSISTANCE UNDER MAP AND NO FMS FINANCING. THE INTER-
MEDIATE LEVEL FOR IMET WOULD BE \$30,000, ENOUGH TO SEND
ONE STUDENT TO EITHER OF THE SERVICE SCHOOLS RECOMMENDED
IN LEVEL 1 AND TWO OFFICERS TO SERVICE BRANCH ADVANCED
COURSES.

C. LEVEL 3 (CURRENT LEVEL) - WE RECOMMEND NO ASSISTANCE
UNDER MAP AND NO FMS FINANCING. THE CURRENT LEVEL OF
\$60,000 FOR IMET TRAINING (PLUS ADDITIONAL MONIES IF COURSE
COSTS INCREASE) WOULD PROVIDE FOR ALL TRAINING REQUIRED TO
KEEP THE AUSTRIAN MILITARY APACE OF NEW MILITARY DEVELOP-
MENTS AND PRACTICES AND WILL ALLOW THE GOA TO HAVE A
CONTINUALLY WELL-TRAINED CADRE TO ASSIST IN IMPROVING THE

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OVERALL DEFENSE POSTURE OF THE MILITARY.

D. INCREMENTAL LEVELS - NO NEW INITIATIVES SHOULD BE MADE IN MAP. FMS FINANCING MIGHT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE 50 M60 TANKS IN THE FORM OF A LONG-TERM CREDIT OF APPROXIMATELY \$50 MILLION OVER A TEN-YEAR PERIOD. WE RECOMMEND THAT A SIMILAR ARRANGEMENT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EVENT GOA SEEKS TO PURCHASE THE RECONNAISSANCE VERSION OF THE F-5E. NO INCREASE IN IMET IS FORESEEN AS AUSTRIA IS UNABLE TO ABSORB THE COST OF TRANSPORTING ADDITIONAL STUDENTS TO THE U.S. AND DOES NOT NOW HAVE A FORCE LEVEL TO MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF ADDITIONAL TRAINING.

E. LEVEL 1 WILL PROVIDE MINIMUM BENEFIT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THAT ONLY ONE MEMBER PER YEAR OF THE AUSTRIAN GENERAL STAFF AND/OR ARMY HIGH COMMAND WILL BE MADE AWARE OF CURRENT U.S. MILITARY THEORY AND WILL HAVE EXPOSURE TO U.S. CUSTOMS AND PERSONNEL. THE RISK OF APPROVING THE CONFIDENTIAL

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BUDGET AT THIS LEVEL IS THAT IT WILL FORCE THE AUSTRIAN MILITARY TO SEEK TRAINING, FOR WHICH IT HAS NO ADEQUATE INTERNAL TRAINING PROGRAMS, FROM OTHER SOURCES, REFLECTING POORLY ON THE U.S. INTENT TO KEEP AUSTRIA A STRONG, PRO-WEST NEUTRAL. LEVEL 2, IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING THE BENEFIT OF LEVEL 1 FUNDING, WOULD ALLOW OFFICERS SLATED FOR ASSIGNMENT TO COMMANDS OF SUBORDINATE UNITS TO LEARN UP-TO-DATE METHODS OF UTILIZING THEIR EQUIPMENT AND FORCES. THE RISK OF APPROVING THE BUDGET AT THIS LEVEL IS LESS THAN LEVEL 1, BUT WOULD STILL FORCE AUSTRIA TO SEEK TRAINING FROM OTHER SOURCES. LEVEL 3 WILL CONSTANTLY REAFFIRM USG SUPPORT OF AUSTRIA IN ITS ROLE AS A STRONG NEUTRAL AND PROVIDE CONTINUING INTERPLAY BETWEEN AUSTRIAN AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL.

F. MANNING LEVELS - IN AUSTRIA, THE DEFENSE ATTACHE HAS

A TWO-MAN STAFF FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE MATTERS (FMS CASH SALES, DISPOSAL AND MONITORING OF MAP EQUIPMENT, AND IMET). THE STAFF IS COMPOSED OF ONE ARMY OFFICER AND ONE ARMY ENLISTED PERSON. AT ALL LEVELS, THIS IS THE MINIMUM FORCE REQUIRED TO OPERATE THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY. THE ONLY INCREASE IN PERSONNEL THAT COULD BE JUSTIFIED WOULD BE ONE ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUAL IN THE EVENT OF APPROVAL OF A MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OR A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN PURCHASES VIA FMS FINANCING.

G. PROGRAM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR FY80, 81 AND 82 SHOULD REMAIN CONSTANT AT \$60,000 PER YEAR, NOT INCLUDING COURSE COST INCREASES AND INFLATION. WOLF

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